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rising incomes.  Between 1996 and
1999, labor productivity grew at an
average rate of 2.6 percent a year,
much faster than the 1.6 percent
average annual increase experienced
over the previous two decades.1  This
allowed the U.S. economy to grow
more rapidly, and with less inflation,
than most economists dared to predict
five years ago.
Economists Stephen Oliner
and Daniel Sichel estimate that at
least two-thirds of the increase in the
growth rate of labor productivity since
1995 is due to heavy investment in
computer hardware, software, and
communication technologies, and the
rapid improvement of those technolo-
gies.  Their study shows that, since
1990, investment in computer software
alone has contributed more to growth
in labor productivity (in fact twice as
much) than all investment in capital
excluding information technology.
Advances in computer
software, combined with large invest-
ments in computing and communica-
tions hardware, are enabling the rapid
expansion of an entirely new medium
of commerce ￿ the Internet.  While
e-commerce accounts for only a small
share of economic activity today, it is
growing many times faster than the
bricks-and-mortar economy.  One of
its most important applications is in
financial services.  Already a signifi-
cant volume of securities trading is
initiated by orders placed at a web site.
Internet banking and electronic bill
payment are predicted to grow rapidly
over the next decade.2
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he United States is in the midst of
an economic boom sustained in
part by rapid technological innovation.
Firms are always looking for ways to en-
hance or protect their market position.





1 This calculation is based on the Bureau of
Labor Statistics index of labor productivity in
the nonfarm business sector of the economy for
the periods 1976-95 and 1996-99.
the potential economic benefits and
costs of these new patents.
While it is too soon to
quantify these effects, there are good
reasons for concern and a number of
things we can do to address those
concerns.  At a minimum, we must
reserve patents for inventions that
represent more than an obvious
combination of existing technologies.
We should be willing to increase the
resources and expertise available to the
patent office to ensure it knows what
has already been invented.  And when
patent disputes reach the courts,
decisions of the patent office should
carry no more weight than is war-
ranted by the quality of its examina-
tions. Over time, we may find that
more radical measures are required.
Or we may find that the patent system
will adapt to this latest in a series of
technological revolutions.
ENGINES OF GROWTH
In our economy, rising labor
productivity is a prerequisite for
sustainable economic growth and
BY ROBERT M. HUNT
Increasingly, they are turning to patents
to protect not just physical inventions,
but more abstract ones such as computer
programs and even ways of doing busi-
ness. Two decades ago, many of these
patents would have been impossible to
obtain, let alone enforce.  But almost ev-
ery day now, another example of these
patents is described in the press.
Are these patents really a
new phenomenon?  Are they good for
the economy?  This article describes
how changes in patent law made it
possible for inventors to obtain patents
on discoveries as abstract as lines of
computer code or simply a way of
conducting business.  It also examines
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Competition in this new
medium is intense.  Naturally, compa-
nies are looking for ways to enhance or
protect their market position.  Increas-
ingly, they are turning to patents to
protect their investments in computer
software and even their business
models.  According to the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, fewer than 100
Internet-related patents were issued
prior to 1992.  Over the next five
years, the patent office granted 750
Internet-related patents.  In 1999
alone, it granted nearly 4000 Internet-
related patents.3  Only a decade ago
virtually none of these patents would
have been granted, and few companies




The American patent system
is designed to reward inventors that
make new and useful discoveries (see
Patent Basics).  But our patent laws
include certain limitations that
preclude the patenting of some
inventions.4
Patent Basics Patent Basics Patent Basics Patent Basics Patent Basics
or over 200 years, the U.S. government has used patents to reward inven-
tors for their discoveries.a  The reward is a grant of the legal right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention for a
limited period of time.  But monopolies imply higher prices and, thus, less
consumption of patented products or processes, which is socially waste-
ful.  A golden rule, then, is that patents should be granted only for dis-
coveries that are really new.
While economists favor the establishment of well-defined property
rights, they also recognize that doing so entails some cost￿at a minimum, the cost of
resolving any disputes that may arise.  That is one reason most countries go a little further,
granting patents only for inventions that are not trivial extensions of what is already known
(the legal concept is called nonobviousness). What￿s more, the monopoly granted ought to
cover only what the inventor discovered and no more.  But to do so, the inventor must
describe the invention in sufficiently precise terms.  If that description is made available to
the public, granting patents can assist in the more rapid dissemination of technological
knowledge.
Each of these features is embodied in the American patent system, which in-
volves inventors, specially trained attorneys, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and
the federal courts.  An inventor typically obtains the services of a patent attorney to under-
take the process of applying to the patent office for a patent on his or her invention.  The
patent application will contain a description of the invention, a discussion of any related
inventions or techniques known to the inventor (what is called the prior art), and a set of
proposed claims that will define the property rights he or she is seeking.  Examiners at the
patent office review the application, conduct their own search of the prior art, decide
whether to grant a patent, and if so, specify the precise language of the patent￿s claims.  In
essence, the inventor and the patent office negotiate a custom-designed property right
tailored to reflect what was invented.b  But a patent can be granted only when an inven-
tion satisfies the requirements set out in the patent statute, as interpreted by federal courts.
An inventor who disagrees with a patent examiner￿s decision may choose to
refile the application and have it reconsidered, or appeal the decision to an administrative
panel and, from there, to a federal appeals court.  If a patent is granted, and the owner feels
the patent is being infringed, he or she can sue the offending party in a federal court. The
patent holder can seek a court order prohibiting any further infringement (an injunction)
and compensation in the form of lost profits or a reasonable royalty. Defendants in a patent
suit typically argue they did not infringe the patent and that the patent is invalid, that is,
the patent office made a mistake when it decided to grant the patent.  The federal courts
decide these cases on the basis of their precedents and the language of the patent statute.
Some infringement cases are settled before a verdict is reached.  This typically involves a
licensing agreement whereby the defendant agrees to pay for the right to use the invention
or to license some of its own patented technologies to the other party.
a The first U.S. patent was granted in 1790 to Samuel Hopkins of Philadelphia, who invented a new
way of making potash (used in soap, glass, and gun powder).
b The patent office￿s online database of patents can be found at its web site: http://www.uspto.gov.
2 So far, growth in these services has been
disappointing.  In an article in the Business
Review, Loretta Mester examined a number of
factors that explain why adoption of these new
payment methods is likely to be initially slow.
These include large up-front costs for deployers;
network effects, which limit consumer interest
in a payment method until its widespread
adoption; and the balance of risk and benefits of
a new payment method as compared to existing
ones.
3 Computer and telecommunication equipment
manufacturers and software developers own
most of these patents.  But here are just a few of
the interesting exceptions to the rule: Walker
Asset Management (owners of the Priceline
patent and 24 others), Citibank (15), Incyte
Pharmaceuticals (the firm responsible for
mapping a significant part of the human
genome, 9 Internet patents), Merrill Lynch (9),
Amazon.com (7), VISA International (7),
Chase Manhattan (6), Andersen Consulting
(5), E-Stamp Corp. (4), and Cybercash (one of
the first developers of e-cash, with 3 patents).
4 The U.S. law of patents can be found in Title
35 of the U.S. Code (http://uscode.house.gov/
usc.htm), which incorporates all of the various
patent statutes enacted over the years.
Patentable Subject Matter.
Assuming the criteria described in the
next section are also satisfied, any new
and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement of these
things, can be patented.  These cate-
gories are quite broad, but the courts
have identified certain types of subject
matter that cannot be patented,
including laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.  Prior
to 1980, most patent attorneys
believed these exceptions precluded
the possibility of patenting computer
software or methods of doing business.
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Patentability Criteria.  To
qualify for patent protection, an
invention must satisfy the require-
ments of utility, novelty, and
nonobviousness.  Utility simply means
that the invention is useful.  Novelty
means the invention is truly something
new.  An invention fails the test of
novelty if before the inventor applied
for a patent something very much like
it already existed or was described in
print.  Existing products or processes,
existing patents, or articles on the
subject in technical publications are
called the ￿prior art.￿
The requirement of
nonobviousness goes a bit further than
the requirement of novelty.  A
patentable invention must be some-
thing more significant than a trivial
extension of the prior art.  In hind-
sight, an invention may seem pretty
obvious, but that is not the standard
used in patent law.  Patent law asks,
would the invention have been
obvious, at the time it was made, to a
person with ordinary skill in the field
and with knowledge of the relevant
prior art?  If the answer is yes, the
invention is obvious and a patent will
not be granted.5
CAN I PATENT THAT?
WELL, NOW YOU CAN
Over the last two decades,
the American patent system has
changed in many ways.  The definition
of patentable subject matter has
gradually been expanded, reversing the
traditional view that computer
programs and methods of doing
business were unpatentable.  In
addition, patentability criteria have
become less strict.  These trends arose
from a series of court decisions
beginning in the early 1980s.  Their
effect has been amplified by certain
other changes, described below.  The
result is a patent system that operates
very differently than it did 20 years
ago.
The Early Years.  In the
1960s and early 1970s, computer
programs enjoyed very limited intellec-
tual property protection.  And it was
widely believed that patent protection
for computer programs was unavail-
able.  This impression was bolstered by
a 1972 Supreme Court decision
(Gottschalk v. Benson) involving an
application to patent a computer
program that translated decimal
numbers into binary numbers.  The
court concluded the program was a
computer programs would run on more
machines.  Firms began to purchase
more software ￿off the shelf,￿ and more
firms began to develop software with
the intention of selling it to as many
customers as possible.  But when a
company widely distributes a computer
program, protecting it as a trade secret
becomes more difficult.
As trade secret protection
became less effective, a number of
firms began to seek other legal
protections.  After many years of study
and debate, Congress modified the
Copyright Act in 1980 to explicitly
extend copyright protection to
computer programs.  But by the early
1990s, it was clear that copyright
afforded relatively narrow protection
for software, allowing rivals to offer
very similar products without infring-
ing the copyright.  Some firms sought
broader forms of protection from
imitation.  What they eventually got
was patent protection for computer
programs.
Computer Programs
Become Patentable Subject Matter.
Long before the meaning of copyright
protection for computer programs was
well defined, the Supreme Court
opened the door to the possibility that
computer programs could be pat-
ented.7  In a 1981 decision (Diamond
v. Diehr), it ruled that an invention
using temperature sensors and a
computer program to calculate the
correct curing time in an otherwise
conventional process of molding
rubber goods could be patented.  The
patent office had rejected the patent
application, arguing the only new
aspect of the invention was the
computer program, which repeatedly
solved a well-known chemical equa-
tion using the temperature data
provided by the sensors.  The Supreme
Court disagreed, arguing that the
invention was an improved process for
making rubber goods that happened to
use a computer program.  Thus, the
5 A more detailed discussion of the
nonobviousness requirement can be found in
my previous article in the Business Review.
6 The key to asserting trade secret protection is
demonstrating that substantial precautions were
taken to prevent the secret from being
disclosed.  See the article by Friedman, Landes,
and Posner.  Since that article was written, the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.
831-9) created new federal criminal penalties
for certain instances of misappropriation of
trade secrets.





mathematical algorithm, which, like
laws of nature or an abstract idea, does
not fall into one of the categories of
patentable subject matter.
This lack of protection did
not matter as much then as it does
today.  At the time, most computers
and computer programs were custom-
designed.  As a result, most computer
programs would not work on another
machine without significant modifica-
tion.  Also, companies developed more
of their own computer programs and
limited outsiders￿ access to their code.
In this environment, firms could
protect their programs as trade secrets,
using state law to prosecute those who
stole the code or disclosed it to the
public.6
When the computer industry
began moving away from custom-
designed machines, toward standard-
ization and mass production, more
7 The Supreme Court later argued it had never
ruled that all computer programs were
unpatentable, only that the computer programs
involved in the early cases were not patentable.8   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
court seemed to distinguish between
mathematical algorithms per se and
the application of an algorithm to
accomplish something useful, con-
crete, or tangible.8  Patent attorneys
learned to write software patent claims
to emphasize the idea of physical
transformations that produce useful,
tangible results.  They also began to
write patent claims in terms of a
computer program embedded in a
machine (that is, a digital computer).
Over time, both approaches gained
acceptance at the patent office and in
the courts.
More recent court decisions
place more emphasis on the impor-
tance of generating useful results than
on producing concrete or tangible
results.  The link to physical transfor-
mations has also become less impor-
tant.  A 1994 decision (in re Alappat)
upheld the patentability of a computer
program that smoothes digital data
before displaying it as a waveform on a
computer monitor.  The patent office
rejected the application, pointing out
the lack of any physical transformation
of matter.  The court disagreed,
arguing the invention, a computer
programmed to compute averages in a
particular way, was a machine and
therefore patentable subject matter.  It
now appears that only computer
programs producing the most abstract
outcomes are at risk of falling outside
the categories of patentable subject
matter.9
Inventors clearly noticed this
change, and the number of software
patents issued increased dramatically
after 1994 (Figure), much more so
than the overall increase in patents
granted.  Many of the firms that are
most prolific in patenting computer
programs are not software companies
per se.  Rather, they are the leading
manufacturers of electronics and
computing devices.
What About Methods of
Doing Business?  Until very recently,
the conventional wisdom was that
business methods did not fall into the
categories of patentable subject matter.
But this conclusion was never as
absolute as it is frequently described,


























Business Method Patents (right scale)
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and author￿s calculations.
Notes:  The chart uses data reported for calendar years.  All patents are all patents on inventions.
This count exludes design and plant patents.  The remaining categories are not mutually exclusive,
nor are they  very precise.  The category Internet is based on a keyword search conducted by the
patent office in July 2000.  The category computer-implemented business methods is based on the
author￿s search for patents falling into patent classification 705 (data processing: financial, business
practice, management, or cost/price determination) conducted in October 2000.  The category
software is based on a count of patents falling into certain classifications (364, 395, 700-7, 713-4,
and 716-17), according to patent office statistics released in April 2000.
The exact number of software patents in existence is a subject of considerable debate.
The U.S. patent classification system does not divide inventions into those that are exclusively
software and those that are not.   The ubiquity of computer programs and the frequency with
which software is closely integrated with specific hardware make such a distinction difficult to
implement, even if it were not misleading.  The count provided above is based on the patent
classes that clearly account for many types and uses of software.  But some of these classes also
include inventions we would typically describe as hardware.  And software programs classified
elsewhere are excluded from this count.
According to the approach used by the author, the patent office has granted roughly
50,000 software patents since 1978.  A keyword search for the terms computer program or software
would turn up about 120,000 patents issued since the early 1970s.  It is likely that the count shown
in the figure exaggerates the number of software patents issued in earlier years while missing many
more issued in recent years.
FIGURE FIGURE FIGURE FIGURE FIGURE
Patents Granted in the U.S. Patents Granted in the U.S. Patents Granted in the U.S. Patents Granted in the U.S. Patents Granted in the U.S.
8 This distinction is not new.  A century before
computer programs, American courts concluded
that new ways of making a machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter (that is,
processes) were indeed patentable.  The
distinction ￿ between a patentable process
versus the law of nature, or abstract idea, that
makes the process work ￿ often turned on
whether the process involved a physical
transformation of matter.
9 In recent law review articles, John Thomas
and Arti Rai have argued that the current
method of determining if a computer program
qualifies as patentable subject matter has been
reduced to a single question: ￿Is the program
useful?￿  Business Review  Q1 2001   9 www.phil.frb.org
patent office, for example, recently
identified 41 instances of what it calls
financial patents issued before 1848.10
The modern variety of this
kind of patent usually involves a
computer.  An early example of what
the patent office now calls ￿computer-
implemented business methods￿ is
Merrill Lynch￿s development of the
cash management account in the
1970s.  This system involved three
accounts linked through a computer
program.  In 1982, Merrill Lynch
obtained a patent on the computer
system and the software to implement
its cash management account.  Rival
Paine Webber sued to invalidate the
patent, arguing that the invention was
an unpatentable business method.  But
a federal court disagreed, concluding
that Merrill Lynch￿s invention ￿￿ef-
fectuates a highly useful business
method and would be unpatentable if
done by hand.￿
By the early 1990s, the
patentability of computer software was
clearly established.  What￿s more,
development of commercial applica-
tions of the Internet exploded.
Suddenly, everyone was developing a
business model, which typically
involved using computers and software
to conduct old forms of business in
new ways.  So it is hardly surprising to
find that the number of applications
for computer-implemented business
methods has grown rapidly in the last
few years, and the patent office is
granting more and more of these
patents (see A Few Patents Involving
Computer Software or Business Meth-
ods).
Any doubt about the viability
of patenting a business method that
relies on computer hardware and
software was eliminated in a single
court decision in 1998 (State Street v.
Signature Financial Group).  In that
10 That number is cited in the recent USPTO
White Paper.  It includes two patents on bank
notes, two patents on financial instruments,
four patents on checks, and five patents on
interest-calculation tables.  The White Paper
also cites a patent, issued in 1907, for an
insurance system.
decision, the court doubted that a
precedent establishing an exception for
business methods had ever existed.
Even if there was one, the court
concluded it was irrelevant under
current patent law.  The patentability
of a business method, according to this
commercial success, to indicate that
an invention was nonobvious.  In
practice, the new test is much easier to
satisfy than the one used over the
previous quarter century and, as a
result, many more inventions now
qualify for patent protection.12
Other Important Changes.
In another change, the new appeals
court strengthened the presumption
that the patent office was correct in
issuing a patent.13  As a result, more
evidence is required to invalidate a
patent.  Other decisions made it easier
for a patent holder to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction ￿ a court order
prohibiting a potentially infringing
activity before the question of infringe-
ment is definitively decided by the
court.14  If we compare trial outcomes
before and after 1982, we find that
courts are much less likely to invali-
date patents and more willing to issue
preliminary injunctions.15
Twenty years ago, it was
not uncommon to see
patents invalidated by
federal courts.
decision, depends on whether the
claimed invention is useful, new, and
nonobvious.
But Patentability Criteria
Were Also Relaxed.  Twenty years
ago, it was not uncommon to see
patents invalidated by federal courts,
often because the claimed invention
was found to be obvious in light of the
prior art.  There was also at least the
appearance that patent cases were
being decided differently in different
parts of the country.  Some
policymakers felt the U.S. was losing
ground to other countries in certain
high technology industries and the
patent system was to blame.  Each of
these concerns contributed to the
decision in 1982 to create a new court
(the Federal Circuit) to hear all
appeals of patent and certain other
cases.  It was hoped that a single
appeals court would reduce any
unequal treatment of patent cases in
the different district courts and that,
by hearing patent cases more regularly,
the court would be able to develop
greater expertise in a highly specialized
area of law.
The decisions of this new
court soon altered the landscape of
U.S. patent law. 11  The most signifi-
cant change was the modification of
the test for determining the obvious-
ness of a claimed invention.  The new
court was more willing to rely on
secondary factors, such as evidence of
11 For additional detail on these changes, see my
1999 Working Paper and my previous article in
the Business Review.
12 Were these changes important? In 1994
Ronald Coolley argued that ￿many patent
attorneys believe that the obviousness defense is
dead and that the cause of death lies in the
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.￿  In 1991, Lawrence Kastriner
claimed that ￿as a result of these changes,
patents today are more likely to be held valid
than, perhaps, at any time in our history.￿ The
title to his article, ￿The Revival of Confidence
in the Patent System,￿ conveys the sense among
some observers that a broken system had been
repaired by the decisions of the Federal Circuit.
Other observers would disagree.  See, for
example, John Barton￿s article.
13 Prior to 1986, federal courts frequently
decided the validity of a patent based on
whichever side presented more convincing
evidence (a preponderance of the evidence).  In
1986, the Federal Circuit ruled that a patent is
presumed to be valid until proven otherwise by
clear and convincing evidence, a more difficult
standard to satisfy.  See Medtronics Inc. v.
Intermedics, Inc. and Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies Inc.
14 Before 1982, federal courts would not grant a
preliminary injunction if they had any
reasonable doubt about the validity of the
patent in question.  The Federal Circuit relaxed
this evidentiary standard.
15 The articles by Adam Jaffe, M.A.
Cunningham, and Donald Dunner and his
colleagues review quantitative evidence of the
change in trial outcomes.10   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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One-Click Purchasing on the Internet One-Click Purchasing on the Internet One-Click Purchasing on the Internet One-Click Purchasing on the Internet One-Click Purchasing on the Internet
In 1999, Amazon.com obtained a patent (no. 5,960,411) for a computer program that stores a customer￿s address and credit card
number in a database; the program allows the customer to make a purchase with a single mouse click.  Amazon￿s rival, Barnes
and Noble, implemented a similar system at its web store.  In December 1999, Amazon obtained a preliminary injunction,
preventing Barnes and Noble from using a one-click ordering process on its web site.  Barnes and Noble added an extra click to
its ordering system and had the injunction thrown out on appeal in January 2000.
“Name  “Name  “Name  “Name  “Name Y Y Y Y Your Own Price” Purchasing on the Internet our Own Price” Purchasing on the Internet our Own Price” Purchasing on the Internet our Own Price” Purchasing on the Internet our Own Price” Purchasing on the Internet
In 1998, Walker Digital, Inc. obtained a patent (no. 5,794,207) on a computer system and software that enable reverse auctions
over a communications network.  This is the most famous of the many computer-implemented business methods patented by
Walker Digital.  Why?  Because it is the patent behind Priceline.com￿s ￿name your own price￿ reverse auction system for selling
airline tickets, hotel rooms, and car rentals.  Soon after obtaining the patent, Priceline sued Microsoft￿s Expedia travel service for
infringement.  Another company, Marketel International, sued Priceline, alleging the patented technology was developed by its
employees and not Walker Digital.  In January 2001, Priceline and Expedia reached a licensing agreement.
Delivering Music Over a Communications Network Delivering Music Over a Communications Network Delivering Music Over a Communications Network Delivering Music Over a Communications Network Delivering Music Over a Communications Network
InTouch Group owns patents (nos. 5,237,157 and 5,963,916) on a method of delivering portions of pre-recorded music at kiosks
and over the Internet.  It recently sued Amazon.com and three other companies that allow customers to sample songs contained
in CDs for sale on their web sites.
The Cash Management Account The Cash Management Account The Cash Management Account The Cash Management Account The Cash Management Account
In 1982, Merrill Lynch received a patent (no. 4,346,442) on a computer system and software that enabled financial transactions
for the cash management accounts it offered to investors.  It was actually a set of three accounts, which included features
typically associated with a checking account.  Unlike most patents of this sort, it has been tested by litigation.  Paine Webber sued
Merrill Lynch to invalidate the patent on the grounds that the computer program was an unpatentable algorithm and the cash
management system was an unpatentable business method. A federal district court rejected both of those arguments.
The  The  The  The  The CollegSure CollegSure CollegSure CollegSure CollegSure CD  CD  CD  CD  CD
In 1989, New Jersey￿s College Savings Bank obtained a patent (no. 4,839,804) on its special certificate of deposit, which pays a
return commensurate with the increase in the cost of college tuition.  Shortly after obtaining the patent, the bank sued CenTrust
Savings Bank for infringement.  The case was settled prior to trial after CenTrust agreed to pay licensing fees to College Savings
Bank.
A Data Processing System for Managing Mutual Funds A Data Processing System for Managing Mutual Funds A Data Processing System for Managing Mutual Funds A Data Processing System for Managing Mutual Funds A Data Processing System for Managing Mutual Funds
In 1993, Signature Financial Group obtained a patent (no. 5,193,056) on a data processing system that enabled a ￿hub and spoke
system￿ for mutual funds.  The system allowed a fund manager to aggregate the assets of several mutual funds into a single
portfolio, reducing overhead costs while maintaining the necessary transaction information for allocating gains, losses, and tax
liabilities to the original mutual funds.  State Street Bank and Trust sued Signature Financial to invalidate the patent.  It
succeeded in the original trial, where the judge concluded that Signature￿s computer program was an unpatentable algorithm as
well as an unpatentable business method.  Both of those conclusions were decisively reversed on appeal in 1998.
Automated Life Insurance Underwriting Automated Life Insurance Underwriting Automated Life Insurance Underwriting Automated Life Insurance Underwriting Automated Life Insurance Underwriting
The technology affiliate of the insurance company Lincoln Re is suing a software company, Allfinanz, for patent infringement.
Allfinanz has a system that issues a temporary life insurance policy at a bank branch within 30 minutes.  Lincoln Re alleges this
system infringes two patents it has obtained for automated risk assessment and decision making.  The company is seeking an
injunction and damages.
Internet Banking Internet Banking Internet Banking Internet Banking Internet Banking
In 2000, S1 (formerly Security First Network Bank) obtained a patent on its three-tier financial transaction system.  It is suing
the company Corillion, a developer of Internet banking software used by several dozen large financial institutions.  There are at
least two dozen patents that involve online banking.  Microsoft owns at least one of them.  Business Review  Q1 2001   11 www.phil.frb.org
ARE THESE NEW PATENTS
GOOD OR BAD?
A patent system is a reward
system developed to encourage
inventors to invest the time and
resources to make valuable discoveries.
But, by creating temporary monopo-
lies, patents also have social costs.  In
particular, consumers must pay more
than the marginal cost of the new
product or process, which results in
too little use of the innovation (see
Patent Basics).  There are also transac-
tion costs associated with determining
the validity of patents and instances of
infringement, plus the costs associated
with negotiating licensing agreements.
Has extending patent protection to
computer software and business
methods increased the rate of innova-
tion?  Is that increase worth the social
costs associated with these patents?
Are the New Patents
Stimulating Innovation?  Between
1995 and 1998, spending on research
and development (R&D) by firms in
the computer programming and data
processing industry increased 67
percent, reaching $14.3 billion.  The
industry accounted for 10 percent of
all private spending on R&D, one-
third of all R&D spending by
nonmanufacturing firms, in 1998.
Employment of scientists and engi-
neers by the industry, another measure
of research activity, increased 59
percent, to 123,000.  That was more
than 12 percent of all scientists and
engineers employed by industry (36
percent of those employed by
nonmanufacturing firms) in 1998.16
As impressive as these
numbers are, they largely reflect the
rapid growth of the industry, whose
sales rose 65 percent between 1995
and 1998.17  Another way to evaluate
these trends is to examine the ratio of
R&D spending to sales, which is a
measure of the research intensity of an
industry.  A high ratio might imply
there are potentially many new
products or processes that are worth
exploring.18  The ratio of R&D
spending to sales for publicly traded
companies in the software and data
processing sector has increased from
about 5 percent in the early 1980s to
about 7.5 percent in recent years.19
Most of that increase occurred prior to
the 1990s, a time when the patentabil-
ity of computer programs was still
uncertain. The percent increase in
R&D intensity for this sector (59
percent) between 1980 and 1999 is
comparable to the overall trend for
publicly held companies (56 percent).
We have far less information
about research activity in the financial
services sector than in other parts of
the economy. We do know that R&D
spending and employment of scientists
and engineers are tiny relative to total
industry revenues and employment.
But we also know that both have
increased rapidly in recent years.
Between 1995 and 1998, R&D
spending in the financial services
sector more than doubled, to $1.6
billion, and employment of scientists
and engineers more than tripled, to
17,500.20
It is important to remember
that patents in these industries are a
recent phenomenon.  The patentabil-
ity of computer software was estab-
lished less than a decade ago.  The
patentability of business methods was
only clearly established in 1998.  Firms
in the computer software and financial
services industries were innovating
rapidly long before it was thought
possible to patent their innovations,
yet they found effective ways to exploit
their innovations without patents.
This makes the availability of patent
protection an unlikely explanation for
the software revolution. It is even less
likely that patent protection played an
important role in the rapid financial
innovation seen over the last three
decades.
More Patents Are Not
Necessarily Better.  From the stand-
point of theory, the claim that more
patent protection encourages more
R&D, and therefore more innovation,
is a qualified one. In economic models
where innovations build on each other
over time, extending patent protection
to less significant innovations can
either raise or lower the rate of
innovation, depending on characteris-
tics of the industry. 21
When patentability criteria
are fairly strict, there is a significant
risk that a discovery will not qualify for
protection, which might discourage
inventors from undertaking costly
projects. If patentability requirements
are relaxed, more inventions will
qualify for patent protection, possibly
reducing the risk of imitation that
inventors face.  But at the same time,
competition between related patented
technologies will increase, reducing
the profits that patents generate.  That
would make patents less valuable and
possibly reduce the incentive to
innovate.  In high technology indus-
tries, where innovation is already
rapid, the first effect is weaker and the
second effect is stronger.  As a result,
16  The data on R&D spending and employment
of scientists and engineers are from the National
Science Foundation￿s annual survey of industrial
R&D for firms contained in the standard
industry classification (SIC) 737, which includes
developers of custom-designed and prepackaged
software, integrators of computer hardware and
software, and firms that provide data processing
services to other companies.
17  This calculation is based on the Census
Bureau￿s Annual Survey of Service Industries.
18 This interpretation of the R&D/sales ratio
can be criticized.  Sales tend to change more
rapidly than R&D budgets.  If previous
investments in R&D are very successful, sales
growth will accelerate.  That would depress the
R&D/sales ratio until R&D budgets are revised
upward.  That is why it is important to examine
this ratio over a number of years.
19 The R&D/sales ratio described here is
derived from all publicly traded firms classified
in SIC 737 in Standard and Poor￿s Compustat
data set.
20 Unlike firms in many other industries, most
providers of financial services do not report
their R&D spending, so the only available data
of this sort come from the NSF survey.  The
NSF reports totals for firms contained in SIC
60-65 and SIC 67 (the finance, insurance, and
real estate sectors).  Unfortunately, that survey
did not cover the service sector in detail prior to
1995.
21 The ambiguous effect of weaker patentability
criteria is found in a number of theoretical
models, including those developed by Jim
Bessen and Eric Maskin, Ted O￿Donoghue, and
Olivier Cadot and Steve Lippman.12   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
relaxing patentability criteria is more
likely to reduce research activity in
industries that are already innovating
rapidly.22
Declining Patent Quality.
Because patents have social costs, they
should be granted only for inventions
that are really new.  Moreover, the
property rights conferred by a patent
should be reasonably related to what
an inventor has actually discovered.  It
is the job of the patent office to ensure
the inventor￿s claims do not overreach.
It is only natural that the
patent office will make more mistakes
when evaluating patent applications in
a new technology field than in fields it
is already familiar with.  The patent
examiner will not know where to look
for the prior art, which will not be
found in the records of previously
issued patents, and will have more
difficulty determining whether an
applicant￿s specification is truly novel
or nonobvious.23  All of these problems
appear in the case of computer
programs.
The patent office has been
widely criticized for issuing patents on
garden-variety software technologies.
The undisputed black eye occurred in
1993, when it granted a patent to
Compton￿s Encyclopedia for a multi-
media search and retrieval system.
Unfortunately, the patent office was
unaware of a great deal of prior art,
including prior patents.  The commis-
sioner soon ordered the patent to be
reexamined, and all its claims were
eventually rejected.24  Unfortunately,
the patent office is apparently reliving
the experience.  In 1998, it issued a
patent for a method to eliminate
problems associated with the year 2000
date change in computer programs.
Again, there was an outcry that the
patent covered techniques widely used
for many years.  And, again, the
commissioner announced that the
patent would be reexamined.25
moving industry, a few months￿ delay
can doom even a state-of-the-art
product.
In this environment, firms
may find themselves in a ￿patent arms
race.￿  This has both defensive and
offensive qualities.  On the one hand,
firms believe they must patent as much
as possible to prevent rivals from
22 This somewhat counter-intuitive result is
demonstrated in my 1999 Working Paper and
explained in more detail in my 1999 Business
Review article.
23 At this point in the application process, the
burden of proving that the claimed invention is
obvious lies with the examiner.  If the applicant
is aware of any relevant prior art, he or she is
obligated to disclose it in the patent application
or risk having the patent invalidated.  But
applicants are not obliged to conduct a
thorough search of the prior art before applying
for a patent.
24  Patent no. 5,241,671.  See the article by E.
Robert Yoches.
Some argue that the worst
patents do not matter because no one
would ever try to enforce them.  But
the real concern is that these examples
signal a large quantity of important,
but poorly examined patents that
could lead to increased litigation,
which is very costly.26  But for every
critic of these patents, there are others
who justify them as a means of
protecting small start-up firms or a new
source of revenues for established
ones.
A Patent Arms Race?  The
nature of innovation and recent
patenting activity may also increase
the potential costs associated with
poor patent quality.  In the computer
software industry and many other high
technology industries, innovation
tends to be cumulative ￿ that is,
inventions tend to build on one
another.  As more and more of these
inventions are patented, firms are
finding they need to cross-license
technologies, often from rivals.  In the
background there is always the fear
that a preliminary injunction will delay
a product￿s introduction.  In a fast-
obtaining patents that might threaten
commercialization of their inventions.
Even when this strategy fails, the firm
is likely to have a larger stock of
proprietary technologies to trade in
cross-licensing agreements with their
rivals.27  On the other hand, a well-
constructed ￿patent thicket￿ can be
used to raise barriers to entry, particu-
larly for start-up firms.
At nearly the same time that
computer-related inventions became
patentable, the federal courts raised
the presumption that the decisions of
the patent office were correct.
Litigants must now produce more
evidence to overcome this presump-
tion, which increases the cost of
invalidating erroneous patents.  In
addition, the courts are more willing to
grant preliminary injunctions than in
the past, which increases the risk that
a firm can be erroneously locked out of
the market for a new good or service.
25 The patent in question is no. 5,806,063
(Date Formatting and Sorting for Dates
Spanning the Turn of the Century), granted to
Bruce Dickens.  The reexamination was ordered
in December 1999.
26  John Barton cites a recent American
Intellectual Property Association survey, which
found that litigating a typical patent infringe-
ment suit through the trial stage generated $3
million in legal costs.
27  In the mid 1990s, Wes Cohen and his
colleagues asked over 1000 U.S. manufacturing
companies why they patented their inventions.
The following answers are ordered by how
frequently they were cited: to prevent copying
(96 percent); to prevent rivals from obtaining
blocking patents (82 percent); to prevent
infringement suits (59 percent); and to use in
negotiations with other firms (47 percent).  The
percentages in parentheses are for product
innovations.  The order is the same for process
innovations, but the percentages are lower.
Bronwyn Hall and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis
also found that these factors were important in
explaining the surge in patenting by American
semiconductor firms.
The patent office has been widely criticized
for issuing patents on garden-variety software
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This may be a prescription for more
litigation, and it may deter smaller
firms from entering certain markets,
thereby reducing competition.
But It￿s Not Clear-Cut.
There are a few countervailing
arguments to consider.  First, while we
should be concerned about the
possibility of technological bottlenecks,
we cannot be certain they will happen.
Firms may develop more efficient ways
to cross-license their proprietary
technologies. For example, the
copyright collectives ASCAP and BMI
coordinate the collection and distribu-
tion of royalties for music played on
the radio.  A number of web sites that
would facilitate patent licensing are
already in development.  Another
approach is the formation of institu-
tions that pool the intellectual
property rights of their members.  This
is not a new idea￿patent pools have
been used to resolve technology
bottlenecks in a number of industries.
But any attempt to construct a patent
pool will come under scrutiny by the
Justice Department, which will be
concerned about the possibility of
collusion.28
Nor do we know how these
patents will hold up in the courts.  The
arguments given above suggest that
patent holders are in a strong position.
But defendants have a strong incentive
to find compelling examples of prior
art missed by the patent office.
Patents of really poor quality are
unlikely to stand up in court.  Antici-
pating this, owners of such patents
may not be very aggressive in asserting
their rights.29  Another possibility is
that courts will narrow what they see
as overly broad claims contained in
these patents.  Rivals may find that it
is easy to ￿invent around￿ a narrow
patent on a computer program or a
business model.30
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Barring significant new
legislation or a sudden reversal of
course by the courts, patents on
computer software and business
methods are here to stay.  What, then,
can we do to maximize the benefits
and minimize the costs?  It turns out
there are many things we can do, but
many of the following ideas are
controversial.
More Resources.  The
obvious thing is to make sure the
patent office has the resources and
expertise required to do quality
examinations in these new fields.  The
patent activities of the office are
largely funded through fees charged to
process patents and to keep them in
force.  The rapid increase in patent
applications has contributed to a rapid
rise in fees, now approaching $1 billion
a year.  Even with this increase in
resources, the patent office spends only
about $2700 per patent application
processed.  The amount of time
required to process patents has
increased more than 50 percent since
1994 and the backlog of pending
patent applications has more than
doubled.31  In certain technology areas,
the increase in the number of examin-
ers has not kept up with the increase
in applications.
More Information.  Many
observers have called for the develop-
ment of databases containing examples
of nonpatent prior art that could be
made available to patent examiners.
The patent office is currently moving
away from its paper-based system to an
approach emphasizing computerized
searches of publicly available data-
bases. But the agency has experienced
many technical problems in imple-
menting its new search systems.  The
patent office and others have called
upon the software industry to develop
its own database of prior art.  Indeed,
the Software Patent Institute was
founded for this very purpose in 1994,
but apparently more needs to be done.
Other ideas are more
controversial.  For example, suppose
we require that before filing for a
patent, applicants must conduct a
search of the prior art and report what
they find in their application to the
patent office.32  This would shift some
of the burden of discovery back to the
inventor.  The problem is how such a
requirement might be implemented.
How do we set a standard for a
minimally acceptable search of the
prior art?  How would foreign appli-
cants comply?  Do we want the patent
office to be swamped with printouts
from 250,000 web searches?
Currently, most of the burden
of identifying relevant prior art lies
with the patent office. Some scholars
propose adopting an opposition system
￿ an administrative process whereby a
third party can dispute a patent either
just before or just after it is issued.33
The idea is to use the self-interest of
28 Robert Merges￿ 1996 article describes how
these arrangements work to reduce the
transaction costs associated with sharing copy-
righted content or patented technologies.  But
he also points out that ASCAP has operated
under an antitrust consent decree since the
1950s.
29 But there remains a legitimate concern that
some patent owners will have an incentive to
file nuisance suits if they believe that defen-
dants will find it cheaper to settle rather than
pursuing an expensive victory in court.
30  For example, just before Christmas 1999,
Amazon.com successfully sued to prevent
Barnes and Noble from using a one-click
ordering system on its web site.  While this was
an embarrassing defeat in court, Barnes and
Noble simply added a second mouse click to its
program.  Unisys holds a patent on a data
compression technique integral to the GIF
format often used for pictures on web pages.  Its
attempts to secure licensing revenues from this
patent stimulated the adoption of new
compression formats.
31 The number of applications awaiting action
by an examiner increased from 107,000 in 1994
to 243,000 in 1999.  In 1994, the average patent
application took 16 months to process.  In 1999,
the average processing time was 25 months.
The delay is worse in certain technology fields.
It took an average of 31 months to issue a patent
on communications or information processing
technology compared to an average 26 months
for all technologies.  It should be noted that,
throughout the 1990s, a share of the fees the
patent office collects has been diverted to the
Treasury.  That share has grown significantly in
recent years.
32 Currently, it is not uncommon for applicants
to search the prior art, but the motivation is
self-interest rather than any binding legal
obligation.
33 See Robert Merges￿ 1999 article.14   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
customers or competitors to generate
more information than the patent
office is able or willing to produce,
which could improve the quality of
patents.  Opposition systems have
been used for many years in Europe
and, until recently, Japan.  But they
are not universally supported because
the evidence presented may be biased
and third parties may have an exces-
sive interest in contesting patents,
even good ones.
Change the Standards Used
by the Courts?  Recall that during the
1980s, the courts began to require
clear and convincing evidence that a
patented invention did not meet the
statutory requirements before invali-
dating the patent.  Many legal practi-
tioners and scholars supported a more
stringent burden of proof, arguing that
the courts had been all too willing to
second guess the patent office during
the 1970s.
But today, it is not unreason-
able to ask whether, for patents in new
technology fields, the courts should be
more skeptical about the quality of
patent examinations.  In that case, we
may wish to return to the previous
evidentiary standard (a preponderance
of the evidence) when evaluating
patents on technologies unfamiliar to
the patent office.  It would also seem
prudent for courts to be more circum-
spect about granting preliminary
injunctions before reaching a final
conclusion about a patent￿s validity.
Stricter Patentability
Criteria Would Help.  One way to
reduce the effect of issuing more
erroneous patents is to adopt a more
stringent test for nonobviousness.
Under a more rigorous test, the fact
that certain prior art was missed is less
likely to affect the examiner￿s final
decision.  Nor is it at all clear that
adopting more rigorous patentability
criteria would adversely affect the
incentive to innovate.  As discussed in
the previous section, there is little
evidence that moving to weaker
patentability criteria in the 1980s led
to more innovation.34
Small Changes Are Already
Being Made.  Recognizing that certain
problems exist, the patent office is not
standing still.  It is developing special
rules for examining patents in the
areas of computer software and
business methods.  It is hiring new
examiners trained in these fields and
developing contacts with a variety of
trade associations.  It has also re-
quested additional resources.
In 1999, Congress enacted a
special prior use defense for patents on
￿methods of doing or conducting
business.￿  Under this defense, a firm
that was using a business method, but
had not disclosed it (because it was a
trade secret), cannot be found to
infringe the patent.35   The usefulness
of this exception is unclear, in part
because the definition of ￿business
method￿ must be established through
litigation.  Nor is it clear that encour-
aging firms to conceal innovative
business practices or reducing the
incentive of firms to dispute invalid
patents would be socially beneficial.36
34  See Adam Jaffe￿s review paper.
35 Section 4302 of the American Inventors
Protection Act (Public Law 106-113), enacted
in 1999.  A patent cannot be invalidated by the
existence of an earlier instance of the invention
when it is concealed, as it must to be protected
as a trade secret.
36  James Barney examines these and other
issues in his recent article.  One unanswered
question is whether the prior use exception
would apply in cases alleging infringement of a
patent on computer software that implements a
business method.
CONCLUSION
The traditional rationale for
granting patents is that they are a
reward to inventors and, as such, spur
innovation.  But this does not mean it
is always better to have more patents.
We don￿t know whether extending
patent protection to computer
programs and business methods
implemented via computers will
stimulate innovation in the software
industry or, for that matter, the
development of financial services on
the Internet.  But there are good
reasons to expect that such patenting
will not provide a whole lot more
incentive to innovate than these firms
already have.  And it may well be the
case that the costs associated with
enforcing, licensing, or invalidating
these patents could be higher than we
have seen in other industries and in
other eras.
We can do a number of things
to minimize the problems associated
with these patents and to maximize
their benefits.  We can at least take
steps to improve the quality of patents
being issued.  This may involve
additional resources, but it may also
require a structural change in our
patent process.  And we should do
more careful empirical research on the
effects of increasing the availability of
patents in high technology industries.
This would give policymakers more
and better information about the costs
and benefits of the ongoing changes in
our patent system.
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